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Despite the reforms undertaken by several countries in Latin
America, the coverage of the region’s pension systems
remains inadequate. Underlying that circumstance are both
context-sensitive factors and those of a more structural
nature, such as the level of relative development, the
difficulty of covering certain segments of the labour market,
and the way in which the systems and incentives are
designed. Given the decisive influence of the structural
factors, the expansion of coverage will require the right
combination of contributory and non-contributory systems,
to which end this article makes some policy
recommendations. Forestalling poverty in old age demands
a combination of social insurance elements (based on saving
and unfunded systems) and social security, involving some
solidary and tax-related financing.
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I
Introduction
The basic aim of any pension system is to provide
people with an income after their retirement, generally
after they meet some eligibility criterion such as age or
incapacity to work, as each society considers
appropriate. The way in which the system is arranged
to finance such income is important, as is the way in
which the contributions and benefits are set, but the
system’s effectiveness in meeting its goal depends on
its including, during their working lives, those who will
later be eligible for the benefits. In that sense a system’s
coverage is one of its most important features.
Clearly, coverage is only one consideration in
judging the quality of a pension system. Several ECLAC
studies have analysed others, such as the system’s
financial sustainability, the quality of the benefits, its
degree of progressiveness and how efficiently it is run.1
An initial proxy of the effectiveness of the region’s
pension systems in covering the target population
(taking 60 as the average age for retirement)2  yields
results that are generally disappointing. In only four of
the countries in table 1 (note the second column) does
there appear to be adequate coverage of the target
population; coverage is deficient in the other 18.3
Table 1 also illustrates the substantial challenge
involved in covering all retirees and the financial
implications of doing so. Take a hypothetical case in
which all retirees (those aged 60 and over) are
maintained by the younger population (aged 29 to 59)
through a system that provides a pension equivalent to
the latter group’s per capita output. In such a scenario
the ratio between the two groups (the first column of
table 1) gives some indication of the maximum level of
income, as a percentage of GDP, that would have to be
transferred to the older population.4  It is plain that the
figures are very substantial, even if the replacement rates
were to be far below those implicit in this calculation.
Hence the need for care in broadening coverage: public
efforts should focus on those who for various reasons
cannot save for their old age, and saving systems should
be established with appropriate incentives for those who
can save.
This article examines some of the reasons for the
limited coverage of pension systems and makes some
policy recommendations on how to expand such
coverage, thereby helping to reduce poverty among the
retired population. The proposals seek to foster financial
sustainability (which is crucial if the policies are to bear
fruit) and to prevent the emergence of perverse
incentives and moral hazards like those that have
traditionally weakened the region’s pension systems.
The analysis prompts the conclusion that meeting the
needs of the retired population demands a combination
of social insurance (typically, prior saving) and social
security, the latter entailing solidary tax-derived
financing of certain basic benefits.
The authors are grateful to Oscar Altimir for his comments and
suggestions.
1 See the studies in the ECLAC Financiamiento del desarrollo series,
as well as Uthoff and Szalachman (1991, 1992 and 1993),
Schulthess and Demarco (1993) and Acuña and Iglesias (1991).
See also Acosta and Ayala (2002), Packard and Shinkai (2000),
Rabelo (2001) and Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos
de Pensiones (2002).
2 The figure is given solely for reference purposes. Retirement ages
in the region range from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 65 for
men.
3 The figures in table 1 should be treated with caution. First, not all
pensions are given on the basis of retirement age; there are many
other reasons, which explains why some percentages exceed 100%.
Second, some countries absent from the table have no formal
pension scheme, and hence the region’s average effective coverage
is less than the table suggests.
4 This approximation is based on the following simplified scheme.
If all output originates among the economically active population
(EAP) aged 20 to 59, GDP can be expressed as GDP = qa * EAP, where
qa is the EAP’s per capita output. If there is no current-account deficit,
expenditure should be equal to output, which corresponds to the
EAP’s spending (including maintenance of minors under 20) plus
that of the retired population (RP), which in this exercise consists
of those aged 60 or more. In other words, GDP = ga*EAP + gr*RP,
where ga and gr respectively represent the per capita spending of
the active and retired populations. Combining the two expressions
gives qa * EAP = ga*EAP + gr* RP. Consequently, the transfer of
income to the retired population can be expressed as (qa-ga)*EAP
= gr*RP. As a percentage of GDP, that is expressed as (qa-ga)*EAP/
qa * PA = gr*RP/qa * PA. If spending by retirees were covered by
a pension equal to the per capita output of the active population
(that is, if gr = qa), then the transfer of income to the retired
population as a percentage of GDP would be equal to RP/EAP, as
shown in table 1. This, of course, is a maximum limit. In general
the replacement rates (in this case the ratio gr/qa) are less than
one.
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II
Factors affecting coverage
Any examination of the determinants of pension
coverage faces the serious problem that data are scarce
and incompatible. Analysis must therefore proceed by
means of a difficult comparison based on unharmonized
and dispersed data, and must be illustrated by reference
to specific cases.
With regard to national legal provisions, in 25
countries of the region all dependent workers must
contribute to pension systems. In only 13 does the
obligation cover independent workers and in 10 the
latters’ contributions are voluntary. Mesa-Lago, Cruz-
Saco and Zamallon (1990) have shown that there is a
substantial gap between what is laid down in the
legislation and the systems’ actual coverage. In an effort
to understand the reasons for the limited coverage
evidenced by the data, this article examines the context
in which the pension systems operate, system design
TABLE 1
Latin America: Coverage of pension systems, by country
(Proportion of beneficiaries, percentages)
Population aged 60 and over/Population Pensioners/ Pensioners/
aged 20 to 59 Population aged 60 and over Total population
Uruguay 34.5 151.8 25.8
Brazil 14.1 139.4 10.0
Chile 17.5 108.2 10.4
Argentina 27.0 104.6 13.8
Trinidad and Tobago 17.0 62.7 5.6
Guyana 14.0 55.9 3.3
Panama 14.6 45.2 3.4
Costa Rica 14.5 35.9 2.5
Peru 14.3 34.0 2.3
Bolivia 16.2 32.8 2.3
Dominica 25.0 31.9 3.5
Paraguay 12.0 28.5 1.5
Mexico 12.9 26.1 1.6
Ecuador 13.9 26.0 1.7
Guatemala 12.5 25.4 1.4
Nicaragua 11.2 22.3 1.0
Colombia 16.1 19.3 1.5
Jamaica 18.8 18.8 1.7
El Salvador 14.3 14.3 0.9
Venezuela 13.0 10.9 0.7
Honduras 12.0 7.9 0.4
Barbados 25.0 4.6 0.7
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from ECLAC (2002) and from Palacios and Pallarès-Millares (2000).
features that determine the level of incentives to
participate, and some personal and labour market
characteristics that affect the outcome.
1. Structural factors
a) Relative development level
Figure 1 reveals a clear connection: the number of
contributors to pension systems increases in line with
the level of per capita GDP. There are three main reasons
for this. First, in general there is a certain correlation
between income levels and the demographic transition,
giving rise to greater demand for mechanisms that
provide an income in old age. Second, on the supply
side, the higher the development level, the greater the
availability of resources (especially public funds) that
can be devoted to a pension system for retirees. Third,
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from the standpoint of the economic structure, the
formal sector’s participation in the economy and
urbanization levels increase as the development level
rises, which make a pension system a more feasible
proposition.
There is a link between per capita output and
pension system coverage, but of course it is not
mechanically causal. Such systems are more the result
of policies specifically designed to set up social safety
nets than a spontaneous consequence of growth.
b) The significance of labour market segments that
are poorly covered
In its Panorama Laboral, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) presents evidence of the meagre
coverage of workers in the urban informal sector.5  Also
hard to cover are non-wage earners and family workers
in agriculture. Using ILO statistics, figure 2 illustrates
these two segments’ significance in total employment
and as a share of the economically active population
(EAP) that contributes to social security. It shows that
the percentage of contributors to social security declines
as the proportion of workers who are poorly covered
grows.6
Another poorly covered segment of the labour
market, separate from those mentioned above,
comprises technical and professional independent
workers whose economic activity is generally more
formal and who are normally more productive. The
reasons for this vary from case to case. In unfunded
systems the explanation lies in the slenderness of the
association between contributions and benefits, which
makes the former seem more like a tax than payments
to a scheme that will provide future income. Since
enforcement is very difficult among these workers, and/
or since the contributions are voluntary, even the most
skilled choose other ways of ensuring future income.
As regards saving-based systems, technical and
professional independent workers find it more attractive
in the short term to devote resources to developing their
own economic activities than to contribute to a system
whose returns are uncertain and whose liquidity is low,
since in such schemes it is impossible to reallocate the
contributions either to finance new activities or to avoid
unwanted risks.
The irreversible nature of the contributions lies at
the root of this disincentive, especially in capitalization
systems where the returns are uncertain because of
macroeconomic volatility and financial market
fluctuations. It is highly unlikely that a majority of such
workers would opt to make irrevocable contributions
to systems that can suffer real losses. Even for
dependent workers, whose membership and
FIGURE 1
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Source: Prepared by the authors using official figures and data from ILO (2000).
5 See ILO (2000).
6 Table 4 presents estimates of employment that is hard to cover
relative to total employment. This category is broader than the urban
informal sector because it includes self-employed workers and non-
wage earners in agriculture.
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contributions are compulsory, exposure to this risk is
involuntary and probably unwanted. In both cases,
obligatory exposure to risk makes social security
contributions seem like taxes. The inequity of this is
all the more apparent when the private pension
companies are not exposed to the same risk, even though
their management might cause losses.
The dilemma facing workers is aggravated by the
costly commissions levied by some recently introduced
systems as a means of covering administrative costs.
The high level of commission discourages the
participation of and contributions from those who can
choose between devoting part of their resources to a
system that (because of the commissions) transforms
only part of their total contributions into a larger
accumulated fund, or trusting in the returns that they
themselves can make through their own labour or
through more efficient financial alternatives.
c) The disadvantaged integration of women in the
labour force
The nature of the informal sector and the
disadvantaged integration of women in the labour force
combine to create a precarious pension situation. To
understand it better, it is helpful to distinguish three
stages.
First are the pre-pension-system or pre-system
factors, of which the most important is women’s
substantially lesser participation in the labour force,
most particularly among lower-income sectors where
a large number of women are non-salaried family
workers. This circumstance stems from the greater
burden of childcare in those sectors, lower educational
levels that lessen the marginal benefit of joining the
labour force, and a lack of local-level institutional
arrangements to provide childcare services (Jiménez
and Ruedi, 1998).
FIGURE 2
Latin America: Employment that is difficult to cover and contributors
to social security


























































































Employment that is difficult to  cover Contributors/EAP
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Women who remain at home throughout their
working lives to care for the household and family run
a grave risk of becoming poor, since they are generally
viewed as their husbands’ dependants and thus can
aspire only to a widow’s pension.
Second are the effects of deficiencies in the way
the pension systems are designed, coupled with
inadequate integration into the labour market. A larger
share of women who work do so for low wages in the
informal sector, their jobs are sporadic or temporary
(such as domestic help) and of poor quality, often in
contexts marked by non-compliance with labour
legislation.7  Their membership of formal pension
systems is therefore limited and discontinuous and,
because they are paid less, such schemes offer them
fewer benefits.
It is worth noting that these conditions obtain
whether the system is a public scheme with a defined
benefit or a private system of individual capitalization.
The phenomena mentioned above are evident in both
cases, which suggests that in general the systems have
not been designed to address the significant inequality
of opportunity that women face in gaining access to
pension schemes.
Third are the post-system factors related to the
accrual of rights. These differ depending on the scheme
in question. In defined benefit pension systems the
greatest disadvantage originates in women’s lower
incomes and less regular work records. Individual
capitalization systems and private schemes feature other
drawbacks. Because of women’s lower contribution
density and lower pay, they accrue fewer rights than
men. That circumstance is aggravated by two others:
women usually retire earlier and live longer than men.
Thus a system that establishes a close link between
contributions and benefits –equalling out the current
value of both, as happens with pensions provided by
private insurance schemes– will necessarily offer
women lower pensions. That happens even when
women accumulate the same resources as men, since
their life expectancy is longer and their retirement
comes earlier.
In sum, women’s status in pension schemes is
structurally disadvantaged. Rectifying that situation
demands that systems be designed differently so as to
acknowledge the difficulties facing women in securing
the opportunities offered by the schemes. Those
difficulties discourage them from joining formal
systems.
2. Pension scheme design and ensuing incentives
a) Contributions as savings or tax
Thus far this article has addressed the consequences
of factors related to the environment in which the
pension systems operate. It is also important, however,
to consider how the systems’ design affects their
coverage. Particularly interesting, more for its
importance in the debate on reform strategies than
because of its actual effect on coverage, is a comparison
of the incentives for social security saving in unfunded
systems and individual capitalization schemes.
One widely held view is that inadequate coverage
is inherent in unfunded systems, which are marked by
only a slender association between contributions and
benefits: pension contributions are viewed more as taxes
than as savings for old age, which leads to evasion and
limited participation. An individual capitalization
scheme, by contrast, which by definition links
contributions and benefits, radically changes the nature
of the contributions, converting them into savings and
thereby fostering wider coverage.
This view has served as a basis for various reform
efforts. Without entering into a discussion of the
theoretical links between savings and incentives, or of
the merits of capitalization as a means of ensuring the
system’s solvency, it can be said here that the scant
empirical evidence available does not confirm the
premise underpinning such a view.8
Analysis of the prototypical Chilean experience
reveals that coverage has not varied greatly between
the two schemes. Table 2 shows that introducing the
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) system
and closing the Instituto de Normalización Previsional
(INP) to new members did not bring about greater
coverage than when only the unfunded system was
available. Rather, trends in coverage reflect economic
performance: coverage declines during recessions and
expands in growth periods.
It is certainly important to design schemes in such
a way as to relate contributions to benefits as a means
of ensuring solvency. It is also important that
simultaneous efforts be made to send the right signals
about saving. The Chilean experience, however, should
lower expectations about how effective such schemes
can be in expanding coverage.
7 See ECLAC, 2000, Statistical annex.
8 Schmidt-Hebbel (1998) and Uthoff (2001) present different visions
of the effects on saving of Chile’s pension reforms. Fox and Palmer
(2001) analyse design options that are also geared to protecting
the solvency of the pension system.
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b) Inconsistent incentives caused by generous but
unsustainable benefits
Robust statistical data are unavailable, but it seems
clear that some systems are designed with inappropriate
incentives that might lead to lower levels of
participation. Some social security systems, for
example, grant benefits not only to the spouse and
dependent children but to other family members who
are of working age. Since the health and pension
programmes are indivisible, and since the benefits are
extended to working-age family members, only one
member joins; the marginal advantages of another’s
joining are less than the costs. In other words, there is a
short-term personal incentive to make contributions but
a disincentive for the family to do the same (Hernández
Licona, 2001).
These practices spring from differences in national
economic conditions and they affect the system’s
financial stability because, if the number of contributors
falls and the number of beneficiaries grows, the
expansion of coverage is unsustainable. In some cases,
moreover, there is an implicit incentive to work in the
informal sector since the benefits extend to working-
age family members who are apparently jobless in the
formal sector (but who work in the informal sector).
c) Weaknesses in the portability of workers’ funds
Another cause of limited coverage is that workers
cannot transfer their funds from one pension scheme
to another without losing the benefits. To receive a
pension, moreover, they have to have made
contributions for some minimum period, but due
account is not taken of the length of time that they have
been affiliated to other schemes, or of the contributions
made to them. In these circumstances it is likely that
workers will opt not to join the schemes, which will
reduce labour mobility and encourage informal activity.
The reforms undertaken in the region have sought
to address this matter and increase portability by
establishing various means of creating (and rebuilding)
personal records covering job history and contributions.
d) Credibility of the system
It is often argued that negative perceptions of the
unfunded systems’ capacity to offer benefits has
undermined membership. Various circumstances have
eroded the system’s credibility and discouraged
participation, including a decline in the real value of
the pensions as a result of inflation and subsequent
budgetary adjustment, and the evidence of inefficiency
and excessive delays.
This argument featured prominently in the
emphasis placed on the total or partial privatization of
pension systems in some countries. The underlying
premise is that private management of the funds should
make the pension system independent of political
decisions, improve its efficiency and ensure a better
allocation of accumulated resources, thereby enhancing
the system’s credibility and building confidence in it.
The broad issues of efficiency and resource allocation
are beyond the scope of this article; they have been
addressed by Rodríguez and Durán (2000) and
Mastrángelo (1999). Those analysts show that the
reforms have not substantially improved efficiency and
that efficiency considerations have little bearing on
people’s decision to join the new schemes. Recent
experience, moreover, suggests that the system’s
independence from political pressure does not
necessarily originate in its separation from the State
apparatus but rather in general institutional and
economic strength. An adverse context can affect
pension schemes that are supposed to be independent.9
3. Myopia about the need to save for old age
One theory as to why pension systems have limited
coverage rests on the argument that people are
TABLE 2
Chile: Trends in pension system coverage
(Percentages)
Year Contributors/Employed Contributors/EAPa
AFP INP Total AFP INP Total
1975 --- 71.2 71.2 --- 61.9 61.9
1976 --- 65.7 65.7 --- 57.3 57.3
1978 --- 56.6 56.6 --- 48.5 48.5
1980 --- 53.3 53.3 --- 47.8 47.8
1982 36.0 16.6 52.6 29.0 13.4 42.3
1984 40.6 13.7 54.3 35.0 11.8 46.8
1986 45.9 11.6 57.5 41.1 10.4 51.6
1988 50.6 9.8 60.4 46.6 9.0 55.6
1990 50.6 8.1 58.7 46.8 7.5 54.4
1992 55.3 6.9 62.2 51.8 6.5 58.3
1994 56.2 5.5 61.7 51.8 5.0 56.9
1996 58.9 4.9 63.8 55.7 4.6 60.4
1998 58.0 4.2 62.2 53.8 3.9 57.7
1999 60.4 4.2 64.6 55.0 3.9 58.9
Source: Arenas de Mesa and Hernández (2001).
a EAP: Economically active population.
9 As part of the effort to deal with the crisis in Argentina, the
Government decided to use the resources that had accumulated in
the private pension funds, forcing them to accept public bonds to
meet the public sector’s financing needs in 2001.
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unmindful of the need to save for old age. This is one
of the main reasons why participation has been made
compulsory. Table 3 uses data on Mexico to illustrate
this myopia. It shows that participation in social security
systems is low in the younger working age groups and
peaks in the group aged 26 to 35. The figures indicate
that, initially, the most common occupational category
comprises wage earners with and without social
security. Among the older age groups there is a decline
in both kinds of wage earners, while the proportion of
independent workers increases and even surpasses 50%
of the economically active population. This is because
wage earners amass experience and financial capital in
their early years in the labour market, which later allows
them to embark on independent activities and become
self-employed.
4. Contextual factors: employment levels
Coverage is also affected by short-term factors,
although the link is difficult to document because of
the scarcity of adequate statistics. Chile’s experience
between 1981 and 1992, as illustrated in figure 3, shows
that when unemployment rises there is a decline in the
share of the EAP contributing to pension schemes.
Hernández Licona (2001) reports a similar situation in
Mexico.
This link arises, of course, because unemployment
cuts the connection with social security institutions. The
region lacks adequate protection mechanisms to
counteract this. One option currently under discussion
consists of unemployment insurance that includes
continuation of social security payments.
TABLE 3
Mexico: Occupational category, by age
(Percentage of the EAP)
Age Wage earners with Wage earners without Employers Self-employed Unwaged Total
IMSS or ISSSTEa IMSS or ISSSTE workers
12-15 2.5 36.6 0.0 3.8 57.2 100.0
16-25 28.1 42.4 1.1 8.3 20.1 100.0
26-35 37.7 29.3 4.3 21.1 7.6 100.0
36-45 32.5 25.2 6.3 29.9 6.0 100.0
46-55 25.0 22.2 8.3 37.2 7.4 100.0
56-65 15.4 16.8 8.2 53.2 6.4 100.0
66-75 5.0 11.0 8.7 67.3 8.0 100.0
76 or more 2.2 13.5 6.2 72.8 5.3 100.0
Source: G. Hernández Licona, 2001.
a
 IMSS: Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social; ISSSTE: Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado.
FIGURE 3
Chile: Relationship between pension
scheme contributors and the
unemployment rate, 1982-1999a
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of figures from the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) and the Superintendencia
de Adminstradoras de Fondos de Pensiones.
a
 Includes contributors to the Instituto de Normalización Previsional
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III
Expanding the systems’ coverage
1. The scale of the problem
The analysis in the preceding section indicates that
progress on coverage has been inadequate in the region,
despite the changes that several countries have made to
their pension systems. Given the influence of structural
factors on this situation, the prospects for a spontaneous
expansion of coverage are not bright in either the public
or private schemes. Thus, the extension of coverage to
those who currently do not or cannot participate in
pension schemes will require specific public action
based on acknowledgement of the particular factors that
systematically exclude those individuals from the
present systems. This article maintains that such a policy
demands the right combination of contributory and non-
contributory schemes. The non-contributory systems,
moreover, should largely be geared to the poor sectors
whose members are unable to save.
The groups that are normally excluded, and to
which the expansion of coverage should accord priority,
are independent urban workers in both the formal and
informal sectors, as well as those in the countryside.
Within these groups, women are particularly
disadvantaged. It is very difficult for pension systems
to include such groups, and the difficulties tended to
mount in line with the informal sector’s growing share
of non-agricultural employment throughout the 1990s.
The scale of the challenge is evident in table 4, which
shows the significance of those segments of the labour
market that are poorly covered as a percentage of the
working population. In the region’s more developed
countries, about 30% of jobs are hard to cover with
pension systems. In the poorer countries the share
usually surpasses 45% of total employment, peaking at
69% in Bolivia.
2. Some general criteria for policies to expand
the coverage of contributory and non-
contributory public pension schemes
Since several proposals can be made on how to expand
coverage, it is important to define some general criteria
before discussing specific policy guidelines. The bulk
of these criteria refer to public systems; given the scale
and nature of the groups that have no coverage, it is
these schemes that will be called upon to save the
vulnerable from poverty. The system should be very
carefully designed so as to circumvent the disincentive
to participate in saving-based systems.
Most of the causes of limited coverage are long-
term, and thus any policy of expansion must be
sustainable if it is to have lasting effects. The system
should therefore be designed to support fiscal burdens
that correspond to the capacity to generate public
resources and devote them to that purpose. Expansion
programmes that are inadequately financed or based
on fleeting windfalls in public finances are
unsustainable and their effects will not last. In several
countries the preparation of the public budget entails
an estimate of the structural and cyclical components
of spending and income. So too should the calculation
of pension systems, with a view to creating an enduring
prospect of greater coverage.
For the same reason, it is inadvisable to expand
systems that are actuarially in deficit: an increase in
the number of members will normally swell the deficit,
making the benefits and the extended coverage
unsustainable. Actuarial equilibrium should therefore
be seen as a precondition for expanding coverage.
If universal coverage is the final goal, an effort
should be made to ensure that those who could meet
their consumption needs in old age on the basis of their
own savings capacity are encouraged to do so, thus
allowing scarce public funds to be devoted to those
groups that lack such a capacity. To that end, people
should be motivated to save for their old age, but the
level of public guarantees (in the form of minimum
guaranteed pensions for those participating in
contributory public schemes) must be carefully set so
as to avoid the moral hazard of inducing them to
contribute only for a certain number of years and
thereafter to evade payments by working in the informal
sector. There must be a permanent incentive to
contribute, perhaps by initially offering low guarantees
and then rewarding every additional year (or two- or
three-year period, for example) with marginal increases
in the guarantee that, at least theoretically, would be
slightly better than the marginal benefit of not working.
The level of basic benefits granted by non-
contributory systems should be set at such a level that
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they do not constitute a disincentive to work once a
certain age has been reached or some other condition
of eligibility has been met. The upper limit should be
set to strike a balance between two criteria, depending
on the conditions in each country. If the basic aim is to
forestall poverty in old age, the pension should not
exceed the estimated poverty line in each country. If
the aim is to preserve the incentive to work, the upper
limit should be below the minimum wage, as long as
the latter is properly calculated at a level close to the
reserve wage for unskilled labour, if this is the section
of the labour force that is to receive the pension.10
Another reason to forego generous benefits in non-
contributory systems is that such benefits discourage
membership of and payments to contributory schemes,
giving the State responsibility for the welfare of those
who could have helped save for their old age. The
expansion of these schemes must therefore be carefully
calibrated by focusing the non-contributory benefits on
those sectors that cannot save. This can be done, for
example, by means testing (of income and assets), self-
selection mechanisms or taxes that offset any unwanted
distributive effects of universal pensions.
It should be kept in mind, moreover, that pension
systems seek to provide income in old age so as to
guarantee a certain level of consumption. It is not always
the case, however, that such consumption needs are best
met through the provision of monetary income. If
programmes are to be sustainable and have lasting
effects, some of the consumption needs of those people
who are not covered by contributory schemes can be
met more effectively through the direct provision of
goods and services, such as health care and access to
medicines. Non-contributory pension systems,
therefore, should be viewed as one link in the network
of social protection rather than as an alternative to
contributory schemes.
Last but not least, the subsidy elements to be
introduced should be as progressive as possible or
distribution-neutral.
3. Some policy recommendations
a) Redesigning pension systems
One significant criticism is that social security
systems in most countries of the region emulate those
previously implemented in developed countries, which
have higher levels of urbanization and less informal
activity. One proposal for securing universal coverage
in the region is the creation (or enlargement, as the case
may be) of a non-contributory scheme that gives a basic
pension to all those who meet certain conditions, such
as age or residence in the country.11  Such a universal
system would not replace the existing contributory
schemes, but it would offer the benefits of timely
coverage of the whole population and low operating
costs. Possible adverse effects in terms of discouraging
saving and work could be mitigated by setting the
pension at an appropriate level, in line with the criteria
outlined above.
The main difficulty with this kind of system is the
cost. Table 5 presents estimates of the cost of a non-
TABLE 4
Latin America: Share of employment that is
difficult to cover with pension schemes,
by country, 1998-1999ª
(Percentage of total employment)
Country Urban Agricultural Total
employment employment employment
that is difficult that is difficult that is difficult
to coverb to coverc to cover
Argentina 32.2 n.d. 32.2
Uruguay 34.9 n.d. 34.9
Chile 25.9 3.9 29.8
Brazil 33.3 13.2 46.4
Mexico 30.1 6.9 37.1
Venezuela 43.5 4.0 47.4
Panama 20.5 12.7 33.3
Costa Rica 17.3 4.7 22.0
Colombia 29.3 7.9 37.2
Paraguay 27.5 21.7 49.2
El Salvador 27.8 10.8 38.6
Ecuador 31.7 n.d. 31.7
Dominican Rep. 26.8 11.2 38.0
Guatemala 20.5 20.1 40.6
Bolivia 36.6 32.7 69.3
Honduras 24.5 20.7 45.2
Nicaragua 26.0 17.8 43.8
Source: ECLAC (2001).
a Countries ranked by 1995 per capita GDP.
b Non-professional, non-technical workers in private establishments
of up to five employees or self-employed staff, unwaged family
workers and domestic employees.
c Self-employed workers and unwaged family workers in
agriculture.
10 In many countries of the region the minimum wage is decided
on the basis of other criteria. Hence its use to determine minimum
pensions might cause sharp distortions.
11 There are universal systems without means tests in New Zealand,
Namibia, Botswana and Mauritius. Other schemes demand such
tests (see Willmore, 2001).
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contributory universal pension for all those over 65,
expressed as a share of GDP. It takes account of different
options for the pension level and the progress that the
countries have made in the demographic transition. The
table offers estimates of three alternatives for a basic
universal pension: i) one that guarantees those over 65
an income equivalent to the indigence line, which covers
solely food costs, ii) another equivalent to the poverty
line, and iii) a pension equal to the minimum wage.
This last is the most burdensome option.
The table shows that for countries in the early
stages of the demographic transition, the cost of a
universal pension to forestall poverty in old age stands
at about 3% of GDP, even though the eligible population
is not yet particularly large. The high cost springs from
the fact that per capita output in these countries is among
the lowest in the region. For countries at a later stage
of the transition the cost falls to an average of 1.7% of
GDP because income levels more than offset the higher
proportion of people over 65, relative to the first group
of countries. Lastly, for countries at an advanced stage
of demographic transition the cost rises again to 2.2%
because a higher proportion of the population is eligible.
The main source of funds for such a programme is
the central government’s current income, which
averages 16% of GDP.12  Setting this figure against the
TABLE 5
Latin America: Estimates of the cost of a universal pensiona
Country Population Urban Urban Minimum Per capita Cost, as % of GDP, of a universal Central
over 65 indigence poverty wage GDP pension equivalent to: government
line line current
incomeb
% of total Dollars/month Dollars/year Indigence Poverty Minimum % of GDP
line line wage
Countries at an incipient
or early transition stage
Nicaragua 3.1 26.3 52.7 471.2 2.1 4.2 25.8
Honduras 3.4 39.3 78.6 69.1 691.2 2.3 4.6 4.1 18.7
Bolivia 4.0 28.0 56.1 55.7 959.7 1.4 2.8 2.8 19.8
Guatemala 3.5 40.7 81.5 73.5 1547.6 1.1 2.2 2.0 11.0
Paraguay 3.5 42.0 83.9 178.3 1602.7 1.1 2.2 4.7 20.5
El Salvador 5.0 33.5 66.9 122.1 1736.8 1.2 2.3 4.2 11.3
Countries in
mid-transition
Ecuador 4.7 19.3 38.5 52.5 1404.4 0.8 1.5 2.1 19.6
Colombia 4.7 37.3 74.6 139.1 2267.8 0.9 1.9 3.5 10.8
Dominican Republic 4.5 42.1 84.3 2479.0 0.9 1.8 15.3
Venezuela 4.4 78.8 155.9 174.7 3036.8 1.4 2.7 3.0 16.3
Panama 5.5 40.7 81.4 25.5 3264.4 0.8 1.6 0.5 20.0
Costa Rica 5.1 37.5 75.1 217.4 3625.2 0.6 1.3 3.7 12.5
Brazil 5.2 26.7 66.2 74.5 4220.6 0.4 1.0 1.1 11.4
Mexico 4.7 56.8 113.6 85.6 4583.4 0.7 1.4 1.1 13.5
Countries at an advanced
transition stage
Chile 7.2 40.9 81.8 163.1 5128.5 0.7 1.4 2.7 21.0
Uruguay 12.9 56.4 112.9 88.6 5930.0 1.5 2.9 2.3 19.2
Argentina 9.7 71.6 143.3 200 7434.9 1.1 2.2 3.1 10.8
Source: Prepared by ECLAC on the basis of official figures.
a
 According to 1999 data.
b
 Excludes social security contributions and transfers to local government.
12 Current public revenue figures are often hard to compare between
countries. Those in table 5 do not include income derived from
public utilities or transfers to local government. The latter are more
significant in countries with federal systems. Since the degree of
private participation in social security differs from country to
country, social security contributions have been deducted from the
data.
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estimated costs, it is clear that a programme of universal
coverage offering a rather modest pension –equivalent
to the level of the poverty line– would call for about
10% to 18% of government income.13  For most
countries in the region, therefore, a universal
programme such as this would exert significant pressure
on public funds, a circumstance aggravated by the status
of the demographic transition and by legitimate
demands for benefits above the poverty line.
Because these two key conditions are present (the
vulnerability of those who for various reasons cannot
save for old age and the scarcity of public funds), Latin
American pension schemes should be mixed. The dearth
of resources makes it crucial to devise appropriate
institutional arrangements that support the saving
capacity of those who can save and thereby release the
State from that responsibility, especially towards the
more affluent groups. At the same time, the need to
protect those whose participation faces structural
obstacles, coupled with the lack of resources,
underscores the importance of non-contributory
schemes and the need to focus them on the poorest
groups.
As to contributory schemes with low contribution
density among low-income groups and women, systems
marked by a close link between contributions and
benefits will be unable to offer such groups a decent
level of income; about 45% of their members will be
eligible for a guaranteed minimum pension (Arenas de
Mesa, 1999). In other words, in a pension system with
defined contributions those groups will remain
underprotected and the State will have to bear the
substantial cost of providing guaranteed pensions.
These considerations have given rise to the
proposal, now adopted by some countries in planning
their systems, to include the solidary financing of a basic
pension. The reforms in Argentina and Uruguay involve
an individual capitalization component but they retain
a basic pension financed through an unfunded system,
which confers some degree of solidarity on the
financing.14  As mentioned earlier, such systems should
take the precautions needed to avert any strategic
conduct by the participants that might affect the
solvency of the unfunded component.
The system described here is potentially superior
to schemes based solely on individual accounts, since
it allows risks to be spread more widely. Individual
capitalization schemes concentrate the risks (potential
financial losses, jobs and income) on the participants
and allow only financial diversification. Unfunded
systems, for their part, are exposed to demographic risk
(an increase in dependency rates) and the possibility of
financial diversification is limited because the
accumulation of funds is normally low. They can,
however, feature some degree of intergenerational
diversification because the risks are shared. Thus a
combination of the two might offer a better risk spread
from both the financial and intergenerational
standpoints.15
Lastly, pension systems are incomplete if they lack
mechanisms (operationally separate, in all likelihood)
to deal with interruptions of contributions as a result of
unemployment and maternity. The region has recently
witnessed a resurgence of interest in unemployment
insurance schemes. Plans to provide income during
periods of unemployment should also involve (at least
for some period) the continuation of contributions to
pension systems, the payments being made from the
unemployment insurance. The continuation of
contributions in this way would obviate the risk that
temporary losses in present income might become
permanent losses in future income (lower pensions),
and there would be a decline in the fiscal burden needed
to provide guaranteed minimum pensions.
b) Lessening the disincentives to participate in
contributory pension schemes
A second line of action is to reduce the alternative
cost of participating in contributory schemes for
independent and self-employed workers, and to enhance
the right of participants to choose between risk and gain.
From this perspective, the voluntary expansion of
those systems’ coverage is constrained by their
inflexibility and the limited range of products on offer,
circumstances that prevent contributors from
influencing what happens to their savings. The anti-
coverage bias arising from irrevocability and the
contributions’ lack of liquidity would diminish if, under
certain conditions and constraints, the accumulated
funds could be accessed and used for purposes that their13 Current income, less social security contributions, has been used
as the source for two reasons. First, the capital account is not used
to finance recurring current spending (pensions). Second, this
programme is not intended to replace the contributory scheme,
which will continue to be financed by social security contributions.
14 The process of social welfare reform in Costa Rica has also
included proposals to retain common financing of a basic pension.
15 Recent experience shows that both private and public institutions
are subject to the risk of political interference. No design can
diversify that risk.
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owners valued highly. The accumulated resources,
however, would probably decline.
In theory, access to the funds is restricted so as to
prevent their diversion towards ends that could endanger
the provision of adequate pensions, but the lack of
access acts as a disincentive that could lead to fewer
accumulated resources. That could be mitigated, and
future pension levels could be safeguarded, by placing
limits on withdrawals and providing options for the
return of funds. To avoid moral hazards in the face of
guaranteed minimum pensions in the contributory
scheme, access to the funds should entail the loss of
the guarantee, at least until they are returned to the
scheme.
Second, contributors should be able to decide
between risk and gain throughout their membership
period. They should be allowed to choose between
various fund management companies and different
funds with varying asset compositions, so as to make
membership of the scheme attractive to those who are
more risk-averse. From the viewpoint of dependent
workers for whom membership and contributions are
obligatory, access to different products offers partial
compensation for the compulsory nature of the system.
In other words, since the contribution is mandatory, it
is at least equitable and fair that contributors should
not be exposed to more risk than they deem proper.
Chile recently reformed its pension system in such a
manner.
Independent workers are discouraged from joining
schemes because of flaws in the tax system. Unlike
dependent workers, independent workers in some
countries (Chile, for example) cannot deduct their
contributions to the pension system from their tax
payments. This involves a degree of double taxation,
since both savings and subsequent pension income are
taxed (Arenas de Mesa, 2000).
c) Rectifying short-sighted views of the need to save
for old age
Low participation rates spring from short-sighted
consumption and saving decisions, inducing
governments to oblige dependent and independent
workers to join pension schemes. Unfortunately there
is no evidence that this has expanded coverage. Thought
should be given to ways of educating potential
participants and making pension schemes a more
attractive saving option. Even in developed countries,
however, the results of information and education
campaigns on the need to save for old age have been
discouraging.16
d) Options for expanding coverage among women
As mentioned earlier, several factors conspire to
constrain coverage among women. Given the structural
features of the region’s labour markets and public
sectors, the debate on how to tackle this matter is in its
infancy. Here we shall deal solely with the question of
widening coverage, since the quality of the benefits
offered to women and other equity issues are beyond
the scope of this article.
In developed countries, issues of gender equity in
social security gained prominence in the 1990s. Matters
such as the difference in retirement age, the credit in
assessed years for women who care for children and
the elderly, coverage for women who work at home,
part time or in domestic service, or whose work is
seasonal (in agriculture, for example), were analysed
and addressed in social security reforms in the 1990s.
Examination of the reasons for limited coverage
discussed above reveals that contributory regimes and
the changes made to them will be of little use in
expanding coverage among women. Systems based on
formal and stable job patterns are rendered ineffective
by women’s lesser participation and poor integration
in the labour market. This is particularly true for women
from lower-income groups. Perhaps the only viable
alternative for the latter, therefore, consists of non-
contributory schemes that avoid moral hazard and that
focus on those who lack the capacity to save or other
means of ensuring income in old age. Since women
comprise a higher proportion of those outside the labour
market and those working in the informal sector, such
programmes would implicitly expand coverage of
women and would do so to a greater extent.
Several proposals have been made on how to set
up special systems for situations in which low-income
women are in the majority, such as work that is highly
seasonal or sporadic. A recent proposal in Chile
recommended that temporary female workers should
have the right to a minimum pension under conditions
that were adapted to the circumstances of their work.17
Such special schemes are helpful inasmuch as they
16 In its electronic edition of 15 April 2002, the Financial Times
reported that a pilot programme conducted by the Government and
pension funds of the United Kingdom, designed to inform thousands
of participants of the meagre pensions that they would receive if
they did not increase their contributions, prompted a positive
response in under 10% of cases.
17 Financial feasibility studies indicated that the proposal would
give rise to a burdensome system, and hence a final proposal is
still being assessed.
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focus on low-income women and continue encouraging
them to save for old age. If they are confined to certain
types of work, however, they lessen the portability of
the benefits and weaken labour mobility, which are
negative outcomes from the perspective of pension
system design and from the standpoint of resource
allocation. The proliferation of special schemes,
moreover, could again give rise to the fragmentation,
inequality and financial disequilibrium that previously
characterized the region’s pension systems.
IV
Conclusions
Although the data on pension system coverage are
inconsistent and incompatible, it is clear that coverage
is heavily dependent on structural economic factors and
that substantial sectors of the population cannot join
contributory schemes. The potential coverage of
contributory systems is determined mainly by the level
of per capita GDP and the importance of the labour
market’s informal and agricultural sectors. Recent
experience does not suggest that private schemes in
which contributions and benefits are more closely
aligned are particularly helpful in expanding coverage,
although they do help make the system more solvent.
The provision of universal protection that forestalls
poverty in old age demands a new design.
The foregoing prompts the conclusion that if the
whole population is to be protected, the right
combination of contributory and non-contributory
schemes will be needed (i.e., systems that bring together
elements of social insurance and social security). In
view of the public cost of non-contributory schemes,
which table 5 shows to be a significant share of GDP,
they should be expanded gradually and focused on poor
groups whose members are unable to save. Their
benefits should be carefully set so as to avoid improper
incentives that undermine contributory schemes and/
or saving for old age. Non-contributory systems seem
to be the main option for expanding coverage of women,
whose disadvantaged integration in the labour market
lessens their prospects of benefiting from systems based
on formal job patterns.
A substantial share of the members of contributory
schemes are underprotected because of the irregularity
of their work, and women in particular find it hard to
establish continuous contribution records.18  According
to projections, this will be a serious problem in the
future. The main response to it is to include in pension
systems an unfunded component that finances a basic
pension in a spirit of solidarity, in conjunction with a
system of savings.
In sum, the provision of universal coverage
requires a combination of social insurance, social
security institutions and solidarity in financing part
of the benefits. A mixed system, involving private and
public components (contributory and non-
contributory), with pensions funded on the basis of
saving and of solidary and tax-related financing, is
better than others that disregard the nature of the
region’s labour markets.
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